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 TYPOLOGY OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE EQUITY 
SUNG EUN (SUMMER) KIM* 
ABSTRACT 
 Private equity, which pools funds for investment in private businesses, is one of the 
largest and fastest growing investment opportunities in the markets today. Private equity 
traditionally sought investments exclusively from sophisticated investors such as high net 
worth individuals and institutional investors. More recently, however, a growing number of 
private equity businesses have gone public and opened their doors to public investors, who 
are drawn to these investments because of the possibility of high returns and the oppor-
tunity to diversify their investment portfolios. In this Article, I review the universe of pub-
lic-private equity (or PPE) businesses that are traded on the United States stock exchanges 
to map out how PPE has engaged with public investors. I find that PPE takes a variety of 
organizational forms, across different jurisdictions, and seeks investments from public 
investors at multiple levels within the private equity structure. While this variety expands 
the menu of options available to public investors, ignoring the fact that there are distinct 
types within the PPE universe can also be the source of investor and regulatory confusion. 
In this Article, I organize the PPE universe into three types according to whether the public 
investor is investing in the private equity adviser, fund, or both. This typology catalogs a 
complex and heterogeneous universe of firms that are sometimes lumped together as one to 
provide a deeper understanding of the unique structural and governance features of each type 
of PPE. And, by taking a segmented view of the company, fund, and securities regulatory 
regimes which apply, this Article takes the first step towards constructing a clear framework 
through which to understand and regulate PPE.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Private equity refers to the business of pooling the funds of indi-
vidual and institutional investors and investing those funds in the 
equity of non-public enterprises. Using this strategy of investing in 
non-public equities, some private equity funds have been able to de-
liver spectacular returns to their investors.1  
 Coming off of record performances in realized investments and 
cash distributions in 2013 and 2014, more than 2,000 private equi-
ty firms sought an estimated $700 billion of capital commitments 
from investors in 2015.2 According to the American Investment 
                                                                                                                  
 1. For example, the overall annual returns from private equity investment strategies 
for the Yale Endowment Fund was 30.6% from 1973 to 2006. RACHEL E.S. ZIEMBA & 
WILLIAM T. ZIEMBA, SCENARIOS FOR RISK MANAGEMENT AND GLOBAL INVESTMENT 
STRATEGIES 67 (2007); THE YALE ENDOWMENT 19 (2006); Steven N. Kaplan & Antoinette 
Schoar, Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence and Capital Flows, 60 J. FIN. 
1791 (2005) (documenting a large degree of heterogeneity among fund returns but substan-
tial persistence of high returns among the strongest performing private equity funds); cf. 
Douglas Cumming & Uwe Walz, Private Equity Returns and Disclosure Around the World, 
41 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 727 (2010) (reporting significant systematic biases in managers’ 
reporting of fund performance); Ludovic Phalippou & Oliver Gottschalg, The Performance 
of Private Equity Funds, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1747 (2009) (arguing that the performance of 
private equity funds has been overstated, reporting an average net-of-fees fund perfor-
mance of 3% per year below that of the S&P 500). 
 2. Antoine Drean, Ten Predictions for Private Equity in 2015, FORBES (Jan. 12, 2015, 
2:09 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinedrean/2015/01/12/ten-predictions-for-private-
equity-in-2015/. For scale, the $700 billion that is estimated to have been invested into pri-
vate equity in 2015 is equivalent to the total amount that the entire arts and culture sector 
contributed to the U.S. gross domestic product in 2014. Javier Panzar, Arts and Culture Ac-
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Council (AIC), a private equity industry group, there were 4,188 
private equity firms and 14,214 companies that were backed by 
private equity firms in the United States in 2015.3 In its most re-
cent press release, AIC reports that the investable capital (some-
times referred to as “dry powder”) of global buyout funds stood at 
$608 billion in September 2017.4 
 The typical investors in private equity have been sophisticated 
investors such as pension funds, endowment funds, and high-net-
worth individuals.5 As a result, public investors did not have the op-
portunity to directly invest in private equity, until recently. 
 The recent decision of several private equity businesses to go pub-
lic has provided public investors the opportunity to directly invest in 
private equity. This is a relatively recent phenomenon that peaked 
during the boom years immediately prior to the 2007-2009 financial 
crises and has continued into the post-crises period.6  
 Some have celebrated this development of public-private equity 
(PPE) as leveling the playing field by making high-yielding in-
vestment opportunities, once reserved exclusively for sophisticated 
investors, more widely available to the public.7 Others have criti-
cized PPE for enriching insiders at the expense of public inves-
tors.8 Such sweeping praise and criticism of PPE, however, fails to 
recognize its heterogeneity.  
                                                                                                                  
counted for Nearly $700 Billion in U.S. GDP, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2015, 1:49 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-arts-culture-gdp-20150112-story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
QG2-TNGC]. 
 3. Private Equity Across the U.S., AM. INV. COUNCIL, http://www.investmentcouncil.org/ 
app/uploads/pegcc18_aic-infographic_v5-2.pdf. 
 4. 2017 Q3 Private Equity Trends Report, AM. INV. COUNCIL, http://www. 
investmentcouncil.org/app/uploads/2017-q3-aic-private-equity-trends-press-release-final.pdf. 
 5. The descriptor ‘sophisticated’ in this context is used to indicate whether investors 
have the capacity to appreciate the complexities and risks of investing in the capital mar-
kets or possess the opportunity and resources to directly or indirectly bargain for protec-
tions when entering into these investments.  
 6. While much has been written about the ways in which increased congressional 
scrutiny following the 2007-2009 financial crises has forced more light on the shadow of 
private equity, this Article focuses on private equity’s own emergence from the shadow into 
the public domain via an initial public offering.  
 7. See, e.g., Trevor M. Gomberg, After the Storm: Unmasking Publicly-Traded 
Private Equity Firms to Create Value Through Shareholder Democracy, 73 ALB. L. REV. 
575, 575 (2010) (“With a stellar reputation and analyst praise, [Blackstone’s] IPO may 
have a far-reaching impact on an industry thrust in the spotlight.”). Blackstone is one 
of the world’s leading private equity firms, with nearly 2,300 employees in twenty-five 
offices worldwide, and its portfolio companies employ more than 550,000 people world-
wide. Who We Are, BLACKSTONE, https://www.blackstone.com/the-firm/overview 
[https://perma.cc/6LQ6-6FT6].  
 8. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public 
Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 260 
n.140 (2008) (“The result is liquidity for Blackstone’s owners at relatively low cost to them, 
but potentially resulting in substantial agency costs being borne by the unitholders.”).  
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 This Article reviews the universe of PPE to explain why and how 
private equity firms and funds have made the decision to go public. I 
examine the initial public offerings (IPOs) of forty-two PPE firms, 
which have a total market capitalization of more than $111 billion, to 
uncover the depth and breadth of the PPE segment. I review the 
company reports, regulatory filings, and organizational documents of 
these firms to understand the motivations and manner of how these 
private equity businesses have made the decision to go public. 
 What I find from this review is that the PPE universe is made up 
of different types of organizational forms (corporation, limited liabil-
ity company, limited partnership, and trust) and funds (open-end, 
closed-end, internally-managed,9 and externally-managed). While the 
well-known private equity groups such as Blackstone, Apollo, Car-
lyle, and Fortress have received the most attention and have been 
written about as representative examples of PPE, they are only a 
subset of this large, growing, and diverse segment of firms.10  
 My assessment of PPEs is that they are hybrid organizations that 
retain some but not all features of private equity and adopt some but 
not all features of a public company. This hybridity creates challeng-
es for their regulation and demonstrates the need for a typology that 
can be used to organize the PPE universe.  
 The tier at which public investors invest affects their economic 
rights, voting rights, the disclosures they will receive, as well as the 
nature of fiduciary relationships.11 Based on this observation that the 
level at which the public investor invests is an important determi-
nant of the key features that organizational, fund, and securities 
regulatory regimes care most about, this Article offers a typology that 
catalogs the PPE universe on this dimension.  
 I sort the PPE universe across three types. The first type of PPE 
offers to public investors shares of the manager (i.e., the entity that 
raises, invests, and manages underlying private equity funds) and / 
or adviser (i.e., the entity that advises the underlying private equity 
funds) of a private equity fund. The second type of PPE offers to pub-
lic investors shares of the private equity fund (i.e., the investment 
company providing equity to operating businesses). The third type of 
                                                                                                                  
 9. An “internally-managed” fund is a fund that has no investment adviser and is inter-
nally managed by its executive directors under the supervision of its board of directors.  
 10. See Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 1, 1 (2008); Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
172, 237-38; Lloyd L. Drury, III, Publicly-Held Private Equity Firms and the Rejection of 
Law as a Governance Device, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 57, 62-66 (2013); Gilson & Whitehead, 
supra note 8, at 251-56.  
 11. See infra Part III for a discussion of the structural, governance, and regulatory 
characteristics of each PPE type.  
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PPE offers to public investors shares of both the manager / adviser 
and fund entities within the private equity group.  
 The main contributions made by this Article are two-fold. First, 
this Article uncovers the complexity and heterogeneity of the PPE 
universe to explain and classify a new generation of private equity. 
This Article also offers the most expansive account of PPE to date by 
reviewing the universe of forty-two firms with a total market cap of 
$111 billion.  
 Second, by taking a segmented view of the company, fund, and 
securities regulatory regime that apply to PPE, this Article provides 
a clear framework through which to organize and regulate PPE. I 
identify the features of each PPE type that are most perilous to 
public investors and make a first attempt to match each type to the 
regulatory regime that is most effective at addressing such perils. 
This segmented and tailored view of regulations is not only useful 
for PPE but could also be extended to other hybrid organizations 
that are subject to multiple regulatory regimes, which may some-
times be in tension with one another.12  
 Part II provides an overview of private equity, PPE, and the het-
erogeneity within the PPE universe to demonstrate the need for a 
typology. Part III organizes the PPE universe according to the public 
investor’s position within the private equity structure. Part IV puts 
the typology to work by matching each PPE type with the multiple 
regulatory regimes, namely applicable organizational laws, fund reg-
ulations, and securities regulations. Part V concludes. 
II.   PRIVATE EQUITY AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE EQUITY (PPE) 
 Private equity, as its name suggests, has many private quali-
ties. Quintessential private equity raises money through private 
placements.13 Once a private equity sponsor has identified a tar-
get, the standard course of action is for the sponsor to take the 
target company, if a public company, private.14 The identity of 
owners and investors, investment strategies, and profits and loss-
es of private equity firms and funds are not typically known to 
outsiders,15 including regulators.16  
                                                                                                                  
 12. Frank Partnoy, Shapeshifting Corporations, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 261, 265-67 (2009). 
 13. See Josh Lerner, Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Course Overview 12 
(Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Paper, No. 98-042, 1997). 
 14. Id. at 12-18 (describing the standard features of private equity firms and noting 
that “[p]rivate equity investors are almost invariably attracted to firms that find tradition-
al financing difficult to arrange”).  
 15. Steven E. Hurdle, Jr., Comment, A Blow to Public Investing: Reforming the Sys-
tem of Private Equity Fund Disclosures, 53 UCLA L. REV. 239, 243-44 (2005) (“Most pri-
vate equity funds and investors appear to agree that keeping investment details confiden-
tial benefits all parties because ‘[limited partners] want to earn the best return possible 
1440  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1435 
  
 Private equity, in the shadows of regulation, has generated im-
pressive returns for its investors. The private equity model has also 
been praised for reducing agency costs that are endemic to publicly-
held companies.17 Michael Jensen went so far as to predict in his 
classic 1989 article that the private equity model of corporate owner-
ship would contribute to the ‘eclipse’ the public corporation.18 More 
recently, Michael Ewens and Joan Farre-Mensa attributed the de-
cline in initial public offerings in the United States to the growing 
supply of capital from private funds, such as private equity.19  
With most of the academic discourse focused on the ways in which 
private equity has displaced public markets, the decision by private 
equity firms and funds to go public is quite a contradiction that defies 
expectations.20 While this development can be good for investors, as it 
expands the menu of investments, and good for the markets, as a 
channel for diffusion of the innovations originated by private equity,21 
it is important to recognize that it is the sponsors of private equity—
not investors or market regulators—that control the decision of wheth-
er, when, and how to make the switch from the private to the public 
realm. And any sweeping statement as to the impact of this develop-
ment on investors and markets fails to recognize the diversity within 
this universe.  
                                                                                                                  
and [general partners] want to safeguard sensitive information about the private compa-
nies in which they invest.’ ” (quoting Mark Heesen, Public Transparency Must Be Balanced 
with Protecting Private Data, 2003 VENTURE CAP. J. 44). 
 16. Private equity firms fit under the private placement exemption, which relieves 
them from the disclosure obligations related to a public offering. James C. Spindler, How 
Private Is Private Equity, and at What Cost?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 321 (2009).  
 17. Notably, Professor Michael Jensen has praised the private equity model for its abil-
ity to reduce agency costs by using high leverage and pay-for-performance compensation. See 
Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61, 
http://hbr.org/1989/09/eclipse-of-the-public-corporation/ar/1 [https://perma.cc/REH7-PWCZ]. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Michael Ewens & Joan Farre-Mensa, The Evolution of the Private Equity Market 
and the Decline in IPOs (Cal. Inst. Tech., Working Paper 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3017610 [https://perma.cc/8NVQ-CU3A] (reporting that more 
firms are able to raise capital while staying private because of the growth in the supply of 
private capital from venture capital and private equity funds). 
 20. Steven Davidoff Solomon characterizes the private equity structure as one that is 
“path dependen[t]” and “stick[y].” Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 481, 527 (2009).  
 21. Elisabeth De Fontenay, Private Equity Firms as Gatekeepers, 33 REV. BANKING 
& FIN. L. 115, 132 n.84, 169 (2013-2014) (noting the “frequent innovations in debt terms 
that originate with private equity-related financings” and “[o]ne of the skills developed 
by private equity firms is the ability to recognize and act on ‘mispricings’ between the 
debt and equity markets”). 
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A.   Private Equity Primer 
 Private equity refers to the business of pooling the funds of indi-
vidual and institutional investors and investing those funds in pri-
vate enterprises. This simple definition of private equity demon-
strates one of its appeals—private equity offers investors an oppor-
tunity to invest in private businesses that are not otherwise readily 
available to buy and sell in the public markets.22 
 Private equity has been one of the largest and fastest-growing 
asset classes in finance. Hitting record performance levels in real-
ized investments and cash distributions in 2013 and 2014, more 
than 2,000 private equity firms sought an estimated $700 billion of 
capital commitments from investors in 2015.23 According to the 
American Investment Council, there were 4,188 private equity 
firms and 14,214 companies backed by private equity firms in the 
United States in 2015.24 
 Below is a diagram of the prototypical private equity structure, 
which also forms the basis for the typology presented in Part III.  
Figure 1.   Prototypical Private Equity Structure 
 
 
 The sponsors are the individuals or entities that solicit invest-
ments from investors into the private equity fund. The private equity 
investment model can be broken down into three functions, each of 
which is typically overseen by separate entities created by the spon-
                                                                                                                  
 22. See, e.g., Stephen Foley, Private Equity Begins to Entice Ordinary  
Investors, FIN. TIMES (May 26, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/ 
e85240c4-b150-11e4-831b-00144feab7de.html#axzz44xp6hRzp [https://perma.cc/YWW7-M4P3] 
(“Investors able to take a long-term view, who are seeking returns potentially higher and un-
correlated to the equity markets, could find private equity an intriguing, if risky, alternative.”). 
 23. Drean, supra note 2. 
 24. Private Equity Across the U.S., supra note 3.  
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sors: (1) the investment adviser provides investment advisory ser-
vices to the fund; (2) the general partner or manager has the legal 
power to control, administer, and take actions on behalf of the fund; 
and (3) the fund pools and holds capital from outside investors.  
 Private equity funds typically acquire a controlling or influential 
ownership interest in the businesses in which they invest, also re-
ferred to as their portfolio companies.25 The private equity invest-
ment structure generates returns through income (e.g., interest, div-
idends, or fees) and capital gains that are realized by the sponsors’ 
eventual exit from their investments in their portfolio companies, 
usually within a three- to five-year term.26  
 The private equity structure is arranged this way to take ad-
vantage of economies of scale, tax benefits, limited liability, and regu-
latory arbitrage opportunities, among other reasons. The investment 
adviser often acts in an advisory capacity for multiple funds raised by 
the same sponsor, which leads to cost savings from economies of 
scale.27 The general partner or manager, as the managing entity with 
legal power to act on behalf of the fund, will generally be liable for 
claims against the fund, and the sponsors insulate themselves from 
this general liability by creating a separate entity to perform these 
managerial functions.28 The fund is typically formed as a limited 
partnership (the investors being the limited partners of the fund) so 
that the entity will be considered a ‘pass-through’ entity for federal 
income tax purposes.29 
 John Morley has studied the pattern of separation of investment 
and management in funds and how this separation limits investors’ 
control of managers. He explains that the separation between inves-
tors and managers actually benefits investors by limiting their con-
                                                                                                                  
 25. This controlling stake provides private equity sponsors with the ability to imple-
ment necessary improvements and changes within their portfolio companies. Private equi-
ty funds often require the executives of the portfolio company to take an ownership share 
so that these executives also have skin in the game. See JAMES M. SCHELL ET AL., PRIVATE 
EQUITY FUNDS: BUSINESS STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS § 1.01 (2015). 
 26. A number of levers are used by private equity sponsors to discipline the execu-
tives of portfolio companies, such as executive compensation and corporate governance 
arrangements, which require that employees or designees of private equity sponsors sit 
on the board of the portfolio company. See, e.g., Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thom-
as, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on 
Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 219 (2009) (describing the corporate govern-
ance advantages of private equity). 
 27. John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment 
Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1233 (2014). 
 28. SCHELL, supra note 25. 
 29. Patrick Fenn & David Goldstein, Tax Considerations in Structuring U.S.-Based 
Private Equity Funds, INT’L FIN. L. REV. 1 (2002), http://www.iflr.com/Article/2027251/ 
Tax-considerations-in-structuring-US-based-private-equity-funds.html [https://perma.cc/ 
8WAP-HUXV]. 
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trol and exposure to liabilities.30 These investors instead rely on ex-
tralegal mechanisms to ensure that their investments are protect-
ed.31 But what happens (and what should happen) when private equi-
ty expands its investor base to public investors who may have differ-
ent preferences and capacities to monitor managers as compared to 
the usual investors in private equity funds? To answer this question, 
I first present a descriptive survey of public-private equity firms and 
funds to expose the diversity within this segment and to demonstrate 
the need for a typology to better understand it.  
B.   Public-Private Equity 
 While private equity firms and funds have traditionally been or-
ganized as unregistered private entities, more and more are choos-
ing to go public. What motivates the decision to go public? As a gen-
eral matter, private firms suffer from liquidity constraints because 
they are limited as to the number and type of investors they can 
accept investments from. On the other hand, public firms suffer 
from the collective action and agency problems that arise from dis-
persed ownership and the separation of such owners from those who 
control the firm.32  
 The reasons why private equity sponsors, in particular, may de-
cide to launch an IPO are numerous. One reason is prompt and flexi-
ble access to funds.33 An IPO allows a private equity fund to seek al-
ternative sources of capital and build a rotating but permanent capi-
tal base for funds.34 This permanence is especially useful amidst eco-
nomic downturns, such as the recent 2007-2009 financial crisis, dur-
ing which it was difficult for private equity funds to rely on private 
investors as the exclusive source of funds.35 
                                                                                                                  
 30. Morley, supra note 27, at 1240-41. 
 31. Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Exit, Voice, and Reputation: The Evolution of 
SPACs, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 854 (2013) (“[R]eputational constraints hold the richly dynam-
ic tension between traditional private equity investors and managers largely in equilibrium.”). 
 32. Kristian D. Allee et al., Private Versus Public Corporate Ownership: Implications 
for Future Profitability 3 (Kelley School of Business, Working Paper No. 2014-16, 2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2375916 [https://perma.cc/HT76-BQUU] (discussing the effect of 
public versus private ownership on firm profitability).  
 33. Mohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and the End of Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 465, 499 (2009) (“Rather than ensuring distributions to the owners and thereby 
forcing the managers to return to the capital markets in pursuit of cash, [private 
noncorporations] . . . go public partly in order to get ‘permanent’ capital.”). 
 34. Orit Gadiesh, When Private Equity Goes Public, FORBES (Jun. 15, 2007, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/2007/06/14/bain-private-equity-oped-cx_og_0615bain.html#1f7dd3f81bff 
(“The upside is that the firms don’t need to waste time and precious human capital on 
fund-raising, a time-consuming process that takes some of the vital players in a private 
equity firm off the field every few years for months at a time.”). 
 35. Thomas Heath, Private Equity Had Role in Crisis, Says Carlyle Co-Founder, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
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 Another reason some private equity sponsors may choose to go 
public is the value of public equity as currency. The ease of moneti-
zation and valuation of the company’s shares allows private equity 
sponsors to attract and retain qualified employees using incentives 
or stock options that are pegged to the value of the company’s  
publicly-traded shares.36  
 Other important motivators include the legacy effect, reputational 
effect, and the status and visibility that comes with being a public 
company.37 Private equity funds are often associated with its founder, 
and the decision to go public can form the core of a succession plan 
and vision for the company that lasts beyond the founder’s term. Al-
so, the rigorous Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure 
requirements and public scrutiny can be expected to improve trans-
parency and accountability of these firms and funds.38  
 The calculus for private equity sponsors is then whether such 
valuation, liquidity, and reputational benefits of going public are 
worth the increased regulatory scrutiny, liability, and related costs 
that come from being a public company. PPE takes a variety of 
forms that reflect the different calculus that has been reached 
among the differing PPE sponsors.  
 In the remainder of this Section, I share some findings from my 
review of forty-two PPEs. All of the details regarding the firms are 
drawn from publicly available sources. The primary sources cited are 
the registration statements, charters, prospectuses, and periodic re-
ports of each firm. All of these sources are publicly available on the 
SEC’s website. Additional details are drawn from the company’s in-
vestor relations page as well as media and analysts’ reports.  
 I constructed the universe of public-private equity firms by first 
running the below company search criteria on Bloomberg. 
                                                                                                                  
article/2009/10/13/AR2009101303014.html [https://perma.cc/E63N-5GHE] (reporting on 
Carlyle Group co-founder David M. Rubenstein’s comments made in 2009 that private eq-
uity is in “a lull” because of difficulty in accessing credit). 
 36. Gadiesh, supra note 34 (“Finally, the leading funds have clearly developed their 
own brands. Taking a page from their own playbooks for growing the value of their portfo-
lio companies, they see ways to use their brands to raise more capital, extend their range 
and pursue more opportunities.”). 
 37. Id. (“Another benefit is differentiation. Money, after all, is rapidly becoming a 
commodity, and leading private equity funds are looking for ways to stand out even further 
from the crowd.”). 
 38. Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Se-
curities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 340 (2013); Hillary A. Sale, 
Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101 (2013). 
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Table 1:   Search Strategy 
Type:  Search (Company) 
Country:  Matches any of the following:  
United States 
Industry:  Matches any of the following:  
Private Equity39 
Trading Status:  Matches any of the following: Active 
 I reviewed the list and excluded firms that were as of September 
1, 2016 either: (1) no longer active or (2) upon reviewing the company 
business description in the most recent Form 10-K, no longer operat-
ing within the private equity segment. The private equity segment is 
defined as firms and funds that are in the business of providing equi-
ty financing to private companies. I supplemented this list with the 
firms that are included in five indexes40 of public-private equity firms 
                                                                                                                  
 39. “Private Equity” is defined by Bloomberg as investments in “equity capital not 
offered on the public exchange. For example, investments made directly into a private 
company; e.g., buyouts.” Technical conversation with Research Specialist, BLOOMBERG 
BNA (June 6, 2016). 
 40. These indexes are:  
1. S&P Listed Private Equity Index: The S&P Listed Private Equity Index 
comprises the leading listed private equity companies that meet specific 
size, liquidity, exposure, and activity requirements. S&P Listed Private Eq-
uity Index, S&P DOW JONES INDICES, http://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/ 
sp-listed-private-equity-index [https://perma.cc/62A2-2FP4].  
2. PowerShares—PSP Global Listed Private Equity Index: The PSP Index 
includes securities, American depository receipts, and global depository re-
ceipts of 40 to 75 private equity companies, including business development 
companies (BDCs), master limited partnerships (MLPs), and other vehicles 
whose principal business is to invest in, lend capital to, or provide services 
to privately held companies (collectively, listed private equity companies). 
PSP—PowerShares Global Listed Private Equity, INVESCO, https:// 
www.invesco.com/portal/site/us/financial-professional/etfs/holdings/?ticker=PSP 
[https://perma.cc/6MED-5PKD].  
3. ALPS | Red Rocks Listed Private Equity Fund: The ALPS | Red Rocks 
Listed Private Equity Fund is an open-end mutual fund that invests in pub-
licly-traded private equity companies that trade on global exchanges. The 
Fund assembles approximately 30 to 50 holdings and is diversified by stage 
of investment, geography, industry, and capital structure. ALPS: Red Rocks 
Listed Private Equity Fund, ALPS, http://www.alpsfunds.com/holdings/ 
alps-red-rocks-listed-private-equity-fund [https://perma.cc/2U29-WEFS].  
4. iShares Listed Private Equity UCITS ETF: The iShares index tracks the 
performance of an index composed of publicly-listed companies active in the 
private equity space. iShares Listed Private Equity UCITS ETF, ISHARES, 
https://www.ishares.com/uk/individual/en/products/251918/ishares-listed-private- 
equity-ucits-etf?siteEntryPassthrough=true [https://perma.cc/8Z3X-VU6Q]. 
5. LPX Direct Listed Private Equity Index: The LPX Direct represents the 
most actively traded LPE companies covered by LPX Group that mainly pursue 
a direct private equity investment strategy. A listed private equity company is 
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(limiting the sample to domestically-organized and domestically-
traded firms), bringing the total number of firms to forty-two.41 
 Twenty-seven of the forty-two PPEs are organized in Delaware, and 
twelve of the forty-two PPEs are organized in Maryland. One firm is 
organized in New York, one in Pennsylvania, and one in Texas. 
  
Chart 1:   PPE Jurisdiction 
 
 
 Thirty-three of the forty-two PPEs are organized as a corporation. 
Four are limited partnerships and four are limited liability compa-
nies. One firm is organized as a trust. 
                                                                                                                  
an eligible candidate for the Index if its direct private equity investments, as 
well as cash and cash equivalent positions and post-Initial Public Offering 
listed investments, represent more than 80% of the total assets of the compa-
ny. LPX Direct, LPX, http://www.lpx-group.com/lpx/lpx-index-family/style-
indices/lpx-direct.html [https://perma.cc/AWK3-JSKG]. 
 41. See Appendix for a list of the forty-two firms, their ticker symbols, the stock ex-
changes on which their shares are traded, and their total market capitalization (as of Sept. 1, 
2017).  
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Chart 2:   PPE Organizational Form 
 
 
 There were six PPEs that were already public before the year 
2004. Since then, there has been a steady stream of PPEs that have 
made the decision to go public every year (except in 2009).  
Chart 3:   PPE IPO Timing 
 
 The issuer of publicly-traded shares is sometimes the manage-
ment company (i.e., the entity that raises, invests, and manages un-
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derlying private equity funds) or adviser (i.e., the entity that advises 
the underlying private equity funds). In these cases, the issuer of 
publicly-traded shares is often a holding company that has been spe-
cifically created for the purposes of the public offering. Among the 
forty-two PPEs that I reviewed, fourteen issued shares at the man-
agement company and / or adviser level. In other cases (twenty-eight 
of the forty-two PPEs), the issuer of publicly-traded shares is the in-
vestment company (i.e., the fund providing equity to operating busi-
nesses). There were six cases (or three pairs of cases) where both the 
manager and fund entities within the same private equity structure 
issued shares to the public. 
C.   Demonstrating a Need for an Investor-Focused Typology  
 As demonstrated by the earlier discussion, PPEs represent a di-
verse and varied segment: PPEs are organized as corporations, lim-
ited liability companies, limited partnerships, and business trusts in 
Delaware, Maryland, New York, Texas, and Pennsylvania. More im-
portantly, PPEs issue shares to the public at every level of the pri-
vate equity structure—the management company, holding company, 
and investment company. And, while this diversity is good for public 
investors in that it expands the menu of investments, it also presents 
challenges to understanding each option on the menu.  
 At the one end of two extremes, the holder of a unit of the invest-
ment company will receive a share of capital gains and income, while 
at the other end, the holder of a unit of the manager or adviser entity 
will receive a share of the manager or adviser’s compensation. Steven 
Davidoff Solomon has explained how investing in a public-private 
equity manager or adviser is much riskier than investing directly in 
the funds.42 This is because the future income of an adviser is de-
pendent on the adviser’s continued ability to earn extraordinary posi-
tive returns. However, investing in the fund directly has its own 
risks, as I later explain. 
 There are two key observations to be made here. First, there are 
very good reasons from the sponsors’ perspective to explain the par-
ticular way any given PPE is structured. The sponsors’ goal is to 
maximize returns and minimize the liability exposure to the sponsors 
in the event of loss. Certainly, the sponsors’ desire to maximize their 
returns while minimizing liability has led to new innovations in the 
marketplace, as discussed above. But the second takeaway is that 
applicable regulations are intended to benefit parties other than the 
sponsor and designed to achieve broader objectives beyond facilitat-
ing innovation. This Article evaluates PPE from the perspective of 
                                                                                                                  
 42. Davidoff, supra note 10, at 237-38. 
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the intended beneficiaries and desired objectives of the regulations to 
which PPE are now subject.  
 What are these laws and regulations? In the remainder of this 
Section, I preview the regulations that apply to PPE before turning to 
the typology that organizes the PPE universe according to the dimen-
sions that these regulations are designed to address.  
 First, organizational laws (corporate, limited liability company, 
partnership, and trust laws) provide businesses with various organi-
zational forms that possess the attributes desired by most such busi-
nesses. Taking corporate law as an example, one primary function of 
corporate law is to provide businesses with a legal form that possess-
es the core attributes of a business that wishes to incorporate.43 Hen-
ry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have identified these core at-
tributes as: legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares, 
delegated management, and investor ownership.44  
 Another function of corporate law is to mitigate the agency costs 
that arise from the separation of ownership and control.45 The sepa-
ration of ownership and control refers to a few managers exercising 
control of a company on behalf of its many owners.46 This separation 
overcomes collective action problems but generates agency costs. 
Agency costs refer to the costs of monitoring the agent (managers) to 
ensure that the agent acts in the best interests of the principal 
(shareholders of the company).47 The conflicts of interest that give 
rise to these agency costs occur between managers and shareholders, 
among shareholders, and between shareholders and other constitu-
ents, such as employees or creditors.48 
 Robert Bartlett’s study of venture capital finance was the first to 
bring attention to the horizontal (inter-investor) agency problems in 
funds.49 Specific to the private equity context, William Birdthistle 
and Todd Henderson have identified the inter-fund conflicts that re-
                                                                                                                  
 43. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, in THE 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 2 (2004) 
(“Self-evidently, a principal function of corporate law is to provide business enterprises 
with a legal form that possesses these five core attributes [of the business corporation].”). 
 44. Id. at 1 (listing the five basic legal characteristics of the business corporation). 
 45. Id. at 2 (“[A] second, equally important function of corporate law . . . is, constraining 
value-reducing forms of opportunism among the constituencies of the corporate enterprise.”).  
 46. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 119-25 (1948). 
 47. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 10 (1991). 
 48. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 43, at 2 (listing the three principal conflicts 
with the corporation). 
 49. Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of 
the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37 (2006).  
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sult from the diversification strategies of private equity investors.50 
These insights can be carried over to PPE to show that the relative 
position of the public investor vis-à-vis other investors has important 
implications for prospective conflicts of interest, which corporate law 
aims to mitigate.  
 Second, fund and fund adviser regulations are intended to address 
the conflicts of interest that arise from both the nature of assets held 
by funds and the separation of funds and managers. The primary 
regulatory regimes are the Investment Company Act of 194051 and 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.52 John Morley explains that the 
most important characteristic of funds (which hold investment as-
sets) is that they are separated from managers (who hold manage-
ment assets) into different entities with different owners.53  
 While this separation of funds and managers may be beneficial to 
the investors of funds,54 I show that because public investors in PPE 
invest at not only the fund but also the manager and adviser levels, 
the analysis of what is good for the investors of funds is necessarily 
incomplete when it comes to evaluating the best interests of public 
investors in PPE. 
 Third, we regulate companies that issue securities to the public 
differently from those that draw funds from private investors.55 PPE, 
by going public, is swept into the public company regulatory regimes. 
The primary regulations are the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 
Act)56 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act).57 The 
stated goals of such regulatory regimes are investor protection, capi-
tal formation, and the stability of the overall financial system.58  
                                                                                                                  
 50. William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, One Hat Too Many? Investment 
Desegregation in Private Equity, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 45, 54-55 (2009).  
 51. The Investment Company Act of 1940 was originally enacted as Chapter 686, Title 
I, sections 2-906, and is now codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 et seq. 
 52. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 was originally enacted as Chapter 686, Title 
II, sections 201-244, and is now codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 et seq. 
 53. Morley, supra note 27, at 1258, 1279. 
 54. John Morley argues that the use of separate entities to hold management assets and 
investment assets limits fund investors’ rights and risks in three distinct ways that are desir-
able to the investment enterprise: First, it limits the exposure of fund assets to the liabilities 
and creditors of the management company. Second, it limits the exposure of fund investors to 
the liabilities and creditors of the management company. And third, it limits fund investors 
from exercising residual control over the management company. Id. at 1240-41.  
 55. Private issuers sometimes are also subject to reporting requirements. Robert P. 
Bartlett, III, Going Private but Staying Public: Reexamining the Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley 
on Firms’ Going-Private Decisions, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 7, 16-20 (2009). 
 56. 15 U.S.C. § 77a. 
 57. 15 U.S.C. § 78a. 
 58. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 38, at 337-38 (“Part of the stress [on securi-
ties regulation] is political, as we debate the right balance among investor protection, the 
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 However, since not every level of the private equity structure goes 
public, only the entity that offers its shares to the public is subject to 
public company regulations, although some disclosures are made on a 
consolidated basis. This inconsistency can be confusing and mislead-
ing to the investor. The next Part offers a typology to help under-
stand and organize the PPE universe by the investor’s point of entry, 
which, as I explain below, is the dimension with which organization-
al, fund, and securities regulatory regimes are most concerned.  
III.   PPE TYPOLOGY  
 To summarize the earlier discussion regarding the various reg-
ulatory regimes that apply to PPE: organizational laws aim to fa-
cilitate the core attributes desired by businesses and to mitigate 
agency costs; fund and adviser regulations aim to mitigate the con-
flicts of interest that arise between fund advisers and fund inves-
tors; and securities regulations aim to protect investors and facili-
tate capital formation.  
For each PPE type, I discuss the issuer, offering, and investor 
characteristics that organizational, fund, and securities laws and 
regulations care about the most. These include their structure: Which 
entity is the issuer and what is the public investor getting a share of? 
Who are the investors in this layer of the private equity structure 
and in other layers? What is the relationship of the issuer to other 
entities within the private equity structure? They also include their 
governance features: Who makes key decisions? Who is in control, 
and are there any limits on public investors’ right to vote on key deci-
sions? Where do potential conflicts of interest arise? I also discuss 
applicable regulations and exemptions, as well as the trends I ob-
serve in my review of the firms within that type and include illustra-
tions using examples from my review of PPEs. 
A.   PPE Type 1: Public-Private Equity Manager 
 Under this structure, the manager and / or adviser of the private 
equity fund is the entity whose shares are being offered to public in-
vestors. In this PPE type, the public investors are situated above the 
funds that are managed by the manager and below the sponsors that 
continue to make key decisions for the entire PPE structure.  
                                                                                                                  
public’s interest in a safe and stable financial system, and the needs of private enterprise 
for access to capital . . . .”). 
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1.   Structure  
 PPE Type 1 (or PPE Manager) serves a managerial or advisory 
role for the underlying funds. The private equity funds that PPE 
Type 1 manages continue to draw investments from private inves-
tors (unless the fund entity has also offered its shares to public 
investors, which is separately discussed as PPE Type 3 below). 
These private investors have committed to contributing a specific 
amount of capital to the funds in the traditional ways that private 
equity draws funds from investors.59  
 PPE Type 1 earns management fees in accordance with contrac-
tual arrangements that it has entered into with the funds that it 
manages. PPE Type 1 receives an incentive fee (also referred to as 
carried interest60), which is paid if investment return targets are 
met by the funds that it manages. If PPE Type 1 also acts as the 
investment adviser, it will earn advisory fees for the transaction 
advisory and oversight services it provides to the portfolio compa-
nies of the funds that it manages. A public investor holding a share 
                                                                                                                  
 59. The general partner will often invest its own capital in the fund (generally 
ranging from 2-5% of a fund’s total capital commitments). PRIVATE EQUITY INT’L, FUND 
FORMATION AND INCENTIVES REPORT (2014), https://www.srz.com/images/content/5/7/v2/ 
57490/SRZ-PEI-Fund-Formation-and-Incentives-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ABZ9-JRTV] 
(reporting that 79% of general partners surveyed contributed more than 1% of the total 
fund size with their own funds). 
 60. The tax treatment of the carried interest as capital gains rather than ordinary 
income has been a highly contested issue. Compare Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: 
Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2008) (arguing 
that the carried interest “loophole” should be closed) with Steve Judge, Why Carried Inter-
est Is a Capital Gain, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2013), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/04/ 
why-carried-interest-is-a-capital-gain/ [https://perma.cc/9ZQG-Y3WQ]. 
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of PPE Type 1 will receive its pro rata share of the above described 
fees earned by the manager and / or adviser. 
 In some cases, the sponsors will form a new entity specifically for 
the public offering. The new entity (or holding company) holds and 
controls the private equity adviser and / or manager entities. One of 
the benefits of a holding company structure is that it gives sponsors 
a blank slate, which provides them with the flexibility to choose 
from a wide range of economic and governance arrangements, as 
outlined below. 
2.   Governance 
 There are three principal strategies used (often in combination) by 
sponsors to retain control over PPE Type 1, even following its public 
offering. The first strategy is to cap the percentage of shares of PPE 
Type 1 offers to the public. The second is to use a dual class structure 
where one class of shares is offered to the public and another class of 
shares is offered to the sponsors and other insiders for the purpose of 
granting voting power to those insiders. Third, the sponsors may en-
ter into contractual arrangements with public investors that provide 
the sponsor with exclusive or outsized voting power. 
 Another feature that is frequently observed in PPE Type 1 is the 
limited call right. This right is triggered when unitholders (other 
than the sponsors and other insiders) hold less than a specified per-
centage of the then issued and outstanding units. Once triggered, the 
issuer has the right, which it may assign in whole or in part to any 
affiliate, to acquire all of the remaining units of the class or series 
held by unitholders (other than the sponsors and other insiders), sub-
ject only to advance notice requirements.61  
3.   Regulation  
 PPE Type 1 avails itself of a number of exemptions under the In-
vestment Company Act.62 One strategy commonly used by sponsors is 
to rely on the exemption set forth in Section 3(a)(1) of the Investment 
Company Act by structuring PPE Type 1 such that the assets and 
income derived from the investment securities of the entity fall under 
the 40% threshold.63 Alternatively, sponsors have also relied on the 
                                                                                                                  
 61. See, e.g., Oaktree Capital Group, LLC, Registration Statement (Form S-1) 189 
(June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Oaktree Capital (Form S-1)], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/1403528/000119312511167852/ds1.htm [https://perma.cc/8KF5-ZLK3].  
 62. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64. 
 63. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(c). To show that PPE holds investment securities with a 
value that does not exceed 40% of their total assets, PPE Type 1s for purposes of defining 
“investment securities” count limited partnership interests in the funds they manage, but 
not general partnership interests if profits are derived from efforts of the general partners. 
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exemption set forth in section 3(b)(1) of the Investment Company 
Act64 by arguing that PPE Type 1 is a separate entity from the fund, 
and therefore, it is not engaged in the investment company business. 
The SEC has, from time to time, been persuaded by this argument 
and has made the determination that certain PPE Type 1s are not an 
investment company; rather, they are in the business of providing 
asset management and financial advisory services to others.65  
 While PPE Type 1 may avoid regulation as an investment compa-
ny, as investment advisers to the investment funds they manage, 
they fall squarely under the regulatory scope of the Investment Ad-
visers Act.66 Notably, the Investment Advisers Act places restrictions 
on management fees payable to PPE Type 1s by the investment funds 
they manage and advise.67 These rules are not compatible with pri-
vate equity fund incentive structures that compensate managers us-
ing a combination of management fees based on the amount invested, 
transaction and advisory fees, and carried interest.68 
 PPE Type 1 has avoided these restrictions by availing itself of ex-
emptions, including amounts that are received from: (1) any private 
equity fund that meets the criteria specified in section 3(c)(7) of the 
Investment Company Act, (2) a “qualified client,” (which is deter-
mined by the assets and net worth of the client), (3) a U.S. non-
resident, or (4) a “business development company” (“BDC”) (which is 
determined by the nature of the portfolio companies in which in the 
fund invests).69 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) narrowed certain of these exemp-
tions, for example by directing the SEC to adjust the dollar amounts 
used to determine whether a client is a “qualified client.”70 In addi-
tion, the Dodd-Frank Act also eliminated the private investment ad-
viser exemption that had permitted advisers with fewer than fifteen 
                                                                                                                  
 64. 15 U.S.C § 80a-3(b)(1). 
 65. Initial Public Offerings of Investment Managers of Hedge and Private Equity 
Funds: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Andrew J. 
Donohue, Director, Division of Investment Management, SEC).  
 66. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21. 
 67. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a) (“No investment adviser registered or required to be regis-
tered with the Commission shall enter into, extend, or renew any investment advisory 
contract . . . if such contract . . . (1) provides for compensation to the investment adviser 
on the basis of a share of capital gains upon or capital appreciation of the funds or any 
portion of the funds of the client.”). 
 68. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text. 
 69. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b).  
 70. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 § 418, 
12 U.S.C. §§ 5481-5603 (2012). 
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clients to avoid registration,71 but these provisions have since been 
rolled back considerably.72  
Further, the sponsors can structure the governance of PPE Type 1 
so that it may avail itself of the “controlled company” exception from 
certain stock exchange listing rules.73 This exception allows PPE 
Type 1 to avoid certain requirements such as the requirement that 
all boards of directors of listed companies have a majority of inde-
pendent directors and the requirement that all listed companies have 
a nominating and corporate governance committee that is composed 
entirely of independent directors.74  
4.   Examples from PPE Review 
 Eleven (not counting the three that are discussed under PPE Type 
3) of the forty-two firms that I reviewed are PPE Type 1 firms.75 I in-
troduce here Oaktree Capital Group, LLC (Oaktree) as a representa-
tive example of a firm with the standard PPE Type 1 features de-
scribed above in the foregoing Sections 1 through 3. Oaktree is a Del-
aware limited liability company and a holding company that controls 
all of the businesses and affairs of the “Oaktree Operating Group.”76 
The “Oaktree Operating Group” refers to the group of limited part-
nerships through which Oaktree owns and controls the general part-
ner and investment adviser of each of its funds.77  
 Oaktree is owned by its Class A and Class B unitholders.78 All 
outstanding Class B units are held by an entity which is controlled 
by Oaktree’s sponsors.79 These Class B units represented, at the time 
of the IPO, 98.23% of the combined voting power of the outstanding 
                                                                                                                  
 71. Id. § 403.  
 72. On September 9, 2016, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 5424, the In-
vestment Advisers Modernization Act of 2016, which, among other things, reduces the 
reporting obligations of investment advisers to private funds unless such investment ad-
viser is a large hedge fund adviser or a large liquidity fund adviser (as such terms are de-
fined in Form PF). 
 73. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.00, Intro. (2018) 
(“A listed company of which more than 50% of the voting power for the election of directors 
is held by an individual, a group or another company is not required to comply with the 
requirements of sections 303A.01 [Independent Directors], 303A.04 [Nominating/Corporate 
Governance Committee] or 303A.05 [Compensation Committee].”).  
 74. Id. 
 75. These companies are: Affiliated Managers Group, Inc., Compass Diversified Hold-
ings, FORM Holdings Corp., Fortress Investment Grp - Cl A, KKR LP, Leucadia National 
Corporation, Oaktree Capital Group, LLC, Och-Ziff Capital Management Group, LLC, PJT 
Partners, Inc., The Blackstone Group LP, and The Carlyle Group LP. 
 76. Oaktree Capital (Form S-1), supra note 61, at 61. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 7. 
 79. Id. at 57. 
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Class A and Class B units.80 As a result, the sponsors control Oak-
tree, the Oaktree Operating Group, and all funds managed thereby.81  
 Further, Oaktree’s operating agreement provides that so long as 
its sponsors (or their successors or affiliated entities) collectively 
hold, directly or indirectly, at least 20% of the aggregate outstanding 
Oaktree Operating Group units (referred to as the “Oaktree control 
condition”), the manager entity, which is 100% owned and controlled 
by its sponsors, will be entitled to designate all of the members of 
Oaktree’s board of directors.82 So long as the Oaktree control condi-
tion is met, Class B units are entitled to ten votes per unit; if the 
Oaktree control condition is not satisfied, Class B units will be enti-
tled to just one vote per unit.83 During the time the Oaktree control 
condition is satisfied, Oaktree will not be required to hold annual 
meetings of unitholders.84 
 As of the date of the prospectus, the sponsors were entitled to ap-
proximately 50.05% of the economic returns of the Oaktree Operating 
Group.85 Some of the sponsors’ economic interests in the Oaktree Op-
erating Group are held through entities other than the issuer, which 
may give rise to conflicts of interest.86 As to conflicts that may arise 
between the interests of the sponsors and public investors in the is-
suer (the Class A unitholder), Oaktree’s operating agreement con-
tains language that makes it difficult for a Class A unitholder to 
challenge the resolution of any such conflicts of interest.87 For exam-
ple, the operating agreement provides that potential conflicts of in-
terest may be resolved by outside directors even if such directors hold 
interests in Oaktree.88 The operating agreement also contains provi-
sions that substantially limit the remedies available to a Class A uni-
tholder compared to those that would have been available if the com-
pany were a corporation.89 Oaktree has also availed itself of the “con-
trolled company” exemption from certain NYSE governance rules.90 
 Oaktree avails itself of many of the features described above as 
characteristics of Type 1 PPE. In this way, Type 1 PPE retains many 
private company-like features even after its decision to go public. As 
such, the primary concern of a public investor in PPE Type 1 is the 
                                                                                                                  
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 57. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 10. 
 84. Id. at 152. 
 85. Id. at 46. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 46-47. 
 88. Id. at 46. 
 89. Id. at 47. 
 90. Id. at 7.  
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conflicts of interest that may arise between the public investor and 
controlling investors, and the role of organizational laws in mitigating 
such conflicts becomes paramount in PPE Type 1. The regulatory im-
plications of this hybridity are explored in greater detail in Part IV. 
B.   PPE Type 2: Public-Private Equity Fund 
 Under this structure, the private equity fund is the entity whose 
shares are being offered to public investors. In this PPE type, the 
public investors are situated underneath and are subject to the ad-
visement and management of the adviser and manager entities con-
trolled by the sponsor.  
Figure 3:   PPE Type 2 (PPE Fund) 
 
 
1.   Structure  
 PPE Type 2 (or PPE Fund) is the entity that is directly engaged in 
making investments in portfolio companies in accordance with its 
investment objective and strategies. By investing in PPE Type 2, in-
vestors have the opportunity to invest in a portfolio of companies that 
are not otherwise available for general public investment. What the 
investor owns is its pro rata share of a portfolio of companies in 
which the fund invests and the returns generated thereby.  
 PPE Type 2 will use the proceeds from its public offering to make 
investments in its portfolio companies. Since returns from these in-
vestments are realized through a sale or public offering of the PPE 
Fund’s portfolio companies, which may take a number of years, an 
investor in these PPEs may have to wait for some time for these real-
ization events to materialize.  
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2.   Governance 
 Typically, PPE Type 2 are organized as corporations, and their 
business and affairs are managed by the fund’s board of directors. 
The board of directors is responsible for appointing officers and over-
seeing PPE Type 2’s investment activities, asset valuations, financ-
ing arrangements, and corporate governance activities.  
 To the extent that the PPE Fund is one of many funds that are 
managed by the manager, the members of the manager’s investment 
team may be faced with conflicts in the allocation of investment op-
portunities and payment of management fees among the different 
funds. Conflicts may be more severe when there are overlapping 
ownership interests between the fund and the adviser.  
3.   Regulation  
 PPE Funds commonly elect to be regulated as both a BDC under 
the Investment Company Act91 and a regulated investment company 
(RIC) under Subchapter M of the Internal Revenue Code (the ‘Code’).92  
BDCs are companies that primarily invest in companies with to-
tal assets of $4,000,000 or less and capital and surplus of 
$2,000,000 or less.93 This election subjects PPE Type 2 to the gov-
ernance requirements of the Investment Company Act94 but offers 
relief from several key economic restrictions that are otherwise ap-
plicable to investment companies under the Investment Company 
Act, notably, leverage requirements.95  
 In order to maintain its qualification as an RIC under the Code, 
PPE Funds must meet applicable income source and distribution as 
well as asset diversification requirements specified in the Code.96 No-
tably, PPE Funds are required to distribute 90% of their investment 
company taxable income back to their investors.97  
In addition, in order to maintain its status as a BDC, 70% of the 
value of the total assets of PPE Type 2 must be invested in qualifying 
assets, as defined in the Investment Company Act.98 The BDC regula-
tory regime provides preferential regulatory treatment to funds that 
                                                                                                                  
 91. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-53. 
 92. 26 U.S.C. §§ 851-852. 
 93. Investment Company Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-46. 
 94. For example, PPE Funds are required to have a board of directors with at least 
40% of its members being not “interested persons” (as that term is defined in section 
2(a)(19) of the Investment Company Act. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10).  
 95. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f). 
 96. 26 U.S.C. § 851. 
 97. 26 U.S.C. § 851(b)(2). 
 98. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-54. 
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comply with the regulatory definitions of a BDC.99 It should be noted 
however that the reason for regulatory relief is not connected to the 
characteristics of the investor in the PPE Fund but to the characteris-
tics of the investee (i.e., the portfolio companies in which the PPE 
Fund invests).  
4.   Examples from PPE Review 
 Twenty-five (not counting the three that are discussed under PPE 
Type 3) of the forty-two firms I reviewed are PPE Type 2 funds.100  
 I use the example of Blackrock Capital Investment Corporation 
(formerly BlackRock Kelso Capital Corporation) to highlight the na-
ture of conflicts and governance arrangements that arise between a 
PPE Fund and other entities within the private equity structure.  
 BlackRock Capital Investment Corp (BKCC) is an externally-
managed, non-diversified, closed-end management investment com-
pany that has elected to be regulated as a BDC under the 1940 Act. 
As a BDC, PPE Funds must obtain stockholder approval to change 
the nature of their business so as to cease to be a BDC. However, it 
should be noted that certain principal investors of BKCC beneficially 
owned approximately 70.8% of the outstanding shares of the compa-
ny’s common stock at the time of its IPO.101  
 Furthermore, BKCC’s adviser and certain entities that are under 
the adviser’s management own shares of BKCC. Certain of the adviser 
entity’s members and employees have negotiated the right to receive a 
number of shares of the issuer’s stock if the performance of the stock 
exceeds certain thresholds.102 In addition, the senior management and 
the chairman of the board of directors have ownership interests in the 
adviser entity (BlackRock Kelso Capital Advisors, LLC).103  
 The primary concern of a public investor in PPE Type 2 is the 
conflicts of interest that may arise between the public investor and 
                                                                                                                  
 99. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-46. 
 100. American Capital Ltd, Blackrock Capital Investment Corporation, Capital South-
west Corp, Capitala Finance Corp, Fidus Investment Corp, FS Investment Corp, FNFV 
Group, Garrison Capital Inc., Gladstone Investment Corp, Goldman Sachs BDC Inc., Golub 
Capital BDC Inc., GSV Capital Corp, Hercules Capital Inc., KCAP Financial Inc., Main 
Street Capital Corp, Medley Capital Corp, MVC Capital Inc., New Mountain Finance Corp, 
Pennantpark Investment Corp, Prospect Capital Corp, Safeguard Scientifics Inc., Solar 
Capital Ltd, TCP Capital Corp, THL Credit, Inc., and Triangle Capital Corp. 
 101. BlackRock Capital Investment Corp., Registration Statement of Small Business 
Investment Companies (Form N-2 Pre-Effective Amendment No.2) 27 (Jun 14. 2007) 
[hereinafter BlackRock Capital (Form N-2)], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
1326003/000119312507135385/dn2a.htm [https://perma.cc/9MZV-724F] (“[C]ertain of our 
principal investors . . . will beneficially own, in the aggregate, approximately 70.8% of 
the outstanding shares of our common stock.”). 
 102. Id. at 71-72 (Certain relationships and transactions).  
 103. Id.  
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its adviser. The role of investment fund and investment adviser 
regulations in mitigating such conflicts therefore becomes para-
mount in PPE Type 2. 
C.   PPE Type 3: PPE (Manager and Fund) Combination 
 The PPE Types that have been reviewed thus far have occupied 
mutually exclusive spheres. BKCC is a PPE Fund with an invest-
ment adviser that is a private entity. Oaktree is a PPE Manager that 
advises and manages funds that draw investments from private in-
vestors. The third and last type of PPE that is discussed here is a 
PPE structure where both adviser and fund entities are offered for 
public investment. 
Figure 4:   PPE Type 3 (PPE Combination) 
 
 
 PPE Type 3 (or PPE Combination) is a combination of PPE Type 
1 and PPE Type 2. It should be noted that PPE Type 3 may be com-
prised of multiple PPE Managers and PPE Funds and thus Figure 3 
is only a simplified depiction of PPE Type 3. While the structural 
and governance features of the PPE Manager and PPE Fund that 
comprise PPE Type 3 are similar to the entities that were described 
in the previous Sections covering PPE Type 1 and PPE Type 2, I 
discuss PPE Type 3 as a separate structure because of its unique 
investor and regulatory implications. There are three pairs of PPE 
Type 3 firms in the forty-two PPE businesses that I reviewed.104 I 
use the example of Ares Management, L.P. (ARES) and Ares Capi-
                                                                                                                  
 104. These pairs are: Apollo Global Management and Apollo Investment Corp; Ares 
Management, L.P. and Ares Capital Corp; and Fifth Street Asset Management Inc. and 
Fifth Street Finance Corp. 
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tal Corporation (ARCC) to illustrate the unique investor and regu-
latory concerns of PPE Type 3.  
 By way of background, ARES was established in 1997 by Anto-
ny Ressler, Michael Arougheti, David Kaplan, John H. Kissick, 
and Bennett Rosenthal (collectively, “Ares co-founders”).105 Imme-
diately prior to the decision to go public, ARES was one of the 
most successful alternative asset management businesses, with 
approximately $74 billion of assets under management.106 As noted 
in ARES’ prospectus: “Over the past ten years, our assets under 
management and total management fees, which comprise a signif-
icant portion of our total fee revenue, have achieved compound 
annual growth rates of 31% and 33%, respectively.”107  
ARCC is a leading specialty finance company that provides debt 
and equity financing to private middle-market companies. Follow-
ing its acquisition of American Capital, Ltd. (ACAS) on January 3, 
2017,108 ARCC became the largest BDC in terms of both market cap-
italization and total assets under management.109 ARCC is external-
ly managed by Ares Capital Management LLC, which is a subsidi-
ary of ARES.110  
1.   Structure 
 ARES: On May 1, 2014, ARES launched its initial public offering, 
selling 11,363,636 common units, which began trading on the New 
York Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol “ARES.”111  
 The common units offered to public investors represented limited 
partner interests in ARES. The proceeds of the offering were used to 
purchase newly issued Ares Operating Group units, to repay outstand-
ing balances of the credit facility, for general corporate purposes, to 
fund growth initiatives, and to reimburse expenses of the offering.112 
                                                                                                                  
 105. Ares Management L.P., WALL ST. J., http://quotes.wsj.com/ARES/company-people 
[https://perma.cc/VKK5-YPVN]. 
 106. Ares Mgmt., L P., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 1 (Mar. 31, 2014) [hereinafter Ares 
Mgmt. (Form S-1)], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1176948/000104746914003231/ 
a2219379zs-1.htm [https://perma.cc/G4BW-PTJC]. 
 107. Id. 
 108. At the time I constructed the PPE universe (as of September 1, 2017) American 
Capital, Ltd. (ACAS) had not yet been acquired by ARCC and is counted in my sample as a 
PPE Fund under Section III.B.  
 109. About Ares Capital, ARES CAPITAL CORP., http://www.arescapitalcorp.com/ 
about-ares-capital-corp [https://perma.cc/FJ84-9F96]. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Ares Mgmt., L.P., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 6 (June 10, 2014) [hereinafter Ares 
Mgmt. (Form 10-Q)], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1176948/000104746914005478/ 
a2220428z10-q.htm [https://perma.cc/G6N8-429Y].  
 112. Id. at 79.  
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 The common units sold in the IPO represented 14.37% of the total 
number of common units outstanding, but only 5.48% of the voting 
power of ARES.113 Immediately following the offering, the Ares co-
founders had sufficient voting power to determine the outcome of 
matters submitted for a vote of unitholders.114 The Ares co-founders 
also own and control Ares Voting LLC, an entity that holds a special 
voting unit, providing it with a number of votes on any matter sub-
mitted for a vote of common unitholders of ARES, which is equal to 
the aggregate number of Ares Operating Group units held by the 
limited partners.115 
 In addition, thirty-seven senior professionals owned common 
units of ARES representing approximately 19% of the total number 
of common units outstanding.116 Furthermore, prior to the IPO, Ares 
Management, L.P. had entered into exchange agreements that pro-
vided holders of Ares Operating Group units the option to exchange 
such units for common units of ARES on a one-for-one basis.117 
Holders of such units include the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 
and Alleghany (referred to collectively by Ares Management, L.P. as 
their “strategic investors”).118 
 ARES also restricts ownership of its common units on the basis 
that it will be administratively advantageous for one of its direct 
subsidiaries (Ares Real Estate Holdings LLC) to be taxable as a real 
estate investment trust (REIT).119 For this reason, ARES’ partner-
ship agreement prohibits any common unitholder from beneficially 
or constructively owning more than 7.5% of the number of all out-
standing common units.120  
 ARCC: ARCC is a closed-end, non-diversified management invest-
ment company incorporated in Maryland.121 ARCC launched its IPO 
on October 8, 2004, with proceeds to be used toward investment in 
portfolio companies in accordance with the investment objectives and 
                                                                                                                  
 113. Id. at 77. 
 114. Ares Mgmt., L.P., Prospectus (Form 424B4) 224 (May 5, 2014) [hereinafter Ares 
Mgmt. Prospectus], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1176948/000104746914004598/ 
a2219983z424b4.htm [https://perma.cc/FW62-RFD3]. 
 115. Id. at 89. 
 116. Id. at 224. 
 117. Id. at 20. 
 118. Id. at 10, 242. 
 119. Id. at 17. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Ares Capital Corp., Articles of Incorporation (Exhibit 99(A)) (Apr. 16, 2004), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1287750/000104746904012712/a2134010zex-99_a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Y5MQ-85EH].  
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strategies described in the prospectus.122 ARCC’s investment objectives 
are to generate current income and capital appreciation through debt 
and equity investments in private, middle-market companies.123 
 Public investors in ARCC are acquiring an interest in ARCC and 
not any other funds that are managed by Ares investment profes-
sionals. In fact, SEC rules limit ARCC’s participation in co-
investments (unless it is able to receive a favorable exemptive order 
from the SEC) with other Ares funds.  
 ARCC pays management and incentive fees and reimbursable ex-
penses to its manager, Ares Capital Management LLC, which is a 
subsidiary of ARES, as described above.124 Public investors in the 
common stock of ARCC thus invest on a gross basis and receive dis-
tributions on a net basis after fees and expenses.125  
 For this reason, ARCC’s manager may have interests that differ 
from those of the public investors of ARCC, which gives rise to a con-
flict. For example, the investment adviser may have an incentive to 
induce portfolio companies to accelerate or defer interest or other ob-
ligations owed to ARCC from one calendar quarter to another in or-
der to maximize its quarterly incentive fee that is based on income.126  
 In addition, ARCC’s manager manages multiple investment 
funds.127 While the company explains that they expect the efforts of 
Ares investment professionals in connection with other fund business-
es will be synergistic with and beneficial to the affairs of ARCC, invar-
iably, conflicts of interest will arise. There may be cases where the 
partners and investment committee of ARCC’s manager will have ob-
ligations to investors of the other funds in which they serve as officers, 
directors, or principals that are adverse to the interests of ARCC.128 
2.   Governance 
 ARES: ARES is organized as a Delaware limited partnership. As a 
limited partnership, ARES is managed by its general partner, which 
is wholly owned by an entity owned and controlled by Ares co-
founders.129 Decisions of the general partner are made by its member 
                                                                                                                  
 122. Ares Capital Corp., Registration Statement (Form N-2) 1, 14 (June 21, 2016) 
[hereinafter Ares Capital Corp. (Form N-2)], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/1287750/000104746916013910/a2228956zn-2.ht. 
 123. Id. at 1-2. 
 124. Id. at 8. 
 125. Id. at 37. 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 84. 
 128. Id. at 36. 
 129. Ares Mgmt. Prospectus, supra note 114, at 12 (Our Organizational Structure Fol-
lowing this Offering and the Offering Transactions). 
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(Ares Partners Holdco LLC), which is an entity owned and controlled 
by Ares co-founders. Each Ares co-founder sits on the board of man-
agers of Ares Partners Holdco LLC so long as he is employed by the 
company and actively provides services.130 Decisions by this board of 
managers are made by a majority of Ares co-founders.131  
 In addition, so long as the “Ares control condition” is satisfied 
(i.e., if the Ares co-founders and other Ares personnel hold 10% or 
more of the limited voting power), ARES’ partnership agreement 
provides that its general partner will have no authority other than 
that which the member of the general partner chooses to delegate 
to it.132 In the event the Ares control condition is no longer satis-
fied, the board of directors of the general partner will be responsi-
ble for the operations and activities of ARES.133 
 Common unitholders’ voting rights are further restricted by a pro-
vision in ARES’ partnership agreement stating that any common 
units held by a person that beneficially owns 20% or more of any 
class of common units then outstanding (excluding affiliates and ap-
proved transferees) cannot be voted on any matter.134 
 ARCC: Ares Capital Corporation’s business and affairs are man-
aged under the direction of its board of directors, which consists of 
five members, three of whom are not “interested persons” (as defined 
in section 2(a)(19) of the Investment Company Act).135 
 ARCC is organized as a Maryland corporation. Pursuant to Mary-
land’s Control Share Acquisition Act, control shares of a Maryland 
corporation have no voting rights except to the extent approved by a 
vote of two-thirds of the votes entitled to be cast on the matter.136 
Maryland law also permits a Maryland corporation to include in its 
charter a provision limiting the liability of its directors and officers to 
the corporation and stockholders for money damages subject to enu-
merated exceptions.137 ARCC’s charter eliminates directors’ and offic-
ers’ liability to the maximum extent permitted by Maryland law.138 
                                                                                                                  
 130. Id. at 63 (“Ares Partners Holdco LLC is owned by our Co-Founders and managed 
by a board of managers, which is composed of our Co-Founders.”).  
 131. Id. (“Decisions by the board of managers generally are made by a majority of the 
Co-Founders, which majority, subject to a minimum ownership requirement, must include 
Antony P. Ressler.”). 
 132.  Id. (“Our common unitholders do not elect our general partner or, except in lim-
ited circumstances, vote on our general partner’s directors and will have limited ability to 
influence decisions regarding our businesses.”). 
 133. Id. at 224. 
 134. Id. at 18-19. 
 135. Ares Capital Corp. (Form N-2), supra note 122, at 148. 
 136. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 3-701 et seq. (West 2017). 
 137. Id. § 2-405.1. 
 138. Ares Capital Corp. (Form N-2), supra note 122, at 198-99. 
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3.   Regulation 
 ARES: Despite its impressive pre-IPO operating history, ARES is, 
pursuant to regulatory definitions, an “emerging growth company” 
(EGC), as that term is defined in the Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups (JOBS) Act.139 As an EGC, ARES is eligible to take ad-
vantage of exemptions from various reporting requirements that are 
otherwise applicable to public companies.  
 ARES has also adopted modifications in its partnership agreement 
that allow its general partners to engage in transactions that might 
be prohibited by state law fiduciary duty standards.140 By purchasing 
the common units, each public investor is treated as having consent-
ed to the provisions set forth in the partnership agreement.141 
 ARCC: Ares Capital Corporation elected to be regulated as a BDC 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940. Ares Capital Manage-
ment LLC, a subsidiary of Ares Management, L.P. and an SEC-
registered investment adviser, is the investment adviser to ARCC.  
4.   Summary 
 The foregoing discussion of ARES and ARCC as a representa-
tive example of PPE Type 3 is intended to show that ARES and 
ARCC, as standalone entities, resemble other PPE Managers and 
PPE Funds, respectively.  
 In the same way that the primary concern for PPE Type 1 was 
conflicts of interest between public investors and controlling inves-
tors, the most pertinent risk for a public investor in ARES is the 
mishandling of conflicts of interest that may arise between its inter-
ests, on the one hand, and the interests of the Ares co-founders, sen-
ior professionals, and strategic investors, on the other hand.  
And in the same way that the primary concern for PPE Type 2 
was conflicts of interest between public investors and the investors 
of the other funds managed by its adviser, the most pertinent risk 
for a public investor in ARCC is the mishandling of conflicts of in-
terest that may arise between its interests, on the one hand, and 
the interests of the investors in the other funds in the Ares plat-
form, on the other hand. 
 However, what is unique about PPE Type 3, and why it is dis-
cussed as a separate type of PPE, is that investors in these cases 
have the opportunity to invest in both the fund and manager enti-
ties should they wish to do so. In other words, public investors in 
PPE Type 3 have the ability to hedge against risks and diversify 
                                                                                                                  
 139. Ares Mgmt. Prospectus, supra note 114, at 16. 
 140. Id. at 249-51. 
 141. Id. at 15. 
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their returns by investing in multiple layers of the same private eq-
uity structure. Then, the primary concern of the public investor in 
PPE Type 3 is whether they are provided with accurate and timely 
disclosures that will allow them to make an informed decision. The 
availability of a market alternative to address the risks associated 
with the individual components of PPE Type 3 prompt a reassess-
ment of the regulatory priorities for PPE Type 3. 
IV.   MAPPING THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ONTO THE TYPOLOGY 
 There are some common features among all PPE that explain why 
and how they should be regulated differently from traditional private 
equity. First, investors in traditional private equity have relied on 
durational limits as a way to discipline the fund.142 Traditional pri-
vate equity funds are not perpetual in duration, and thus sponsors 
have to attract new capital every few years. This capital raising cycle 
tends to motivate high levels of fund performance. On the other 
hand, public investors in PPE are not locked into their investment for 
any period of time and, if dissatisfied, can sell their shares in the 
open market at any time.143 For this reason, while the freedom of con-
tract to negotiate the durational limits of investment is important for 
traditional private equity, in the PPE context, the focus is on the tim-
ing and content of disclosures to aid PPE investors in making the de-
cision of whether or not to exit their investment. 
 Second, while traditional private equity draws large amounts of 
investments from a small number of investors, PPE draws varying 
amounts of investments from a large number of investors. For this 
reason, many exemptions that were available to traditional private 
equity because of the small number of investors, their wealth, and 
the private nature of offerings are no longer applicable to PPE. 
 While there are commonalities among them, PPEs as shown in 
Parts II and III are a diverse and heterogeneous segment. More im-
portantly, PPEs issue shares to the public at every level of the pri-
vate equity structure—the management company, investment com-
pany, or both. At the same time, PPE is an organization (i) with mul-
tiple owners and managers, (ii) that pools capital from multiple 
sources for investment in other enterprises, and (iii) that offers its 
securities to the public. As such, (i) organizational, (ii) fund / adviser, 
and (iii) securities regulatory regimes all apply.  
                                                                                                                  
 142. Masulis & Thomas, supra note 26, at 222. 
 143. Lee Harris, A Critical Theory of Private Equity, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 259, 275 
(2010) (“Limited partnership investors’ ability to constrain management’s conduct by sell-
ing their interests in the firm is less realistic because the market for such interest is thin, 
with relatively few buyers and sellers.”). 
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 The result of this multiplicity has been the piling on of regula-
tions, which may unintentionally create increased opportunities for 
regulatory arbitrage. As discussed in Part III, the usual levers used 
to control agency problems in large public corporations are generally 
unavailable in PPE Type 1. At the same time, contractual limits on 
voting and fiduciary duties are commonly observed. The guarantee of 
permanent capital that comes from PPE’s public status could poten-
tially dilute the efficiency of private equity governance, and the gov-
ernor role of repeat, institutional owners may be limited when there 
is a conflict of interests among investors. Notably, the widespread 
use of devices like limited call rights and exchange agreements, 
which create gains for some investors at the expense of other inves-
tors, means there can be no expectation of fair treatment.  
 After noticing these gaps, the remainder of this Article matches 
each PPE type to the regulatory regime that is best equipped to 
manage these concerns. What I’ve shown from the discussion in Part 
III is that there are risks that are especially pertinent to each type of 
PPE. The primary concern of a public investor in PPE Type 1 is the 
conflicts of interest that may arise between the public investor and 
controlling investors, and the role of organizational laws in mitigat-
ing such conflicts becomes paramount in PPE Type 1. The primary 
concern of a public investor in PPE Type 2 is the conflicts of interest 
that may arise between the public investor and its adviser, and the 
role of investment fund and investment adviser regulations in miti-
gating such conflicts becomes paramount in PPE Type 2. Lastly, the 
primary concern of a public investor in PPE Type 3 is the accuracy of 
disclosures that will allow the investor to make an informed decision, 
and the role of securities regulation in facilitating such decisionmak-
ing becomes paramount in PPE Type 3. This segmented view of the 
PPE universe facilitates the tailoring of regulations.  
A.   PPE as an Organization 
1.   Regulatory Overview 
 Organizational laws (e.g., corporate, partnership, LLC, and trust 
laws) regulate the internal organizational affairs of PPE. Substantive 
regulation of organizational affairs is seen as a subject for state regula-
tion. As a result, when it comes to principles of corporate governance, 
the laws of the entity’s state of organization are determinative.144 The 
                                                                                                                  
 144. Since it would be impossible to summarize the law for all entity types for all 
states, I use Delaware as the representative example. Delaware is the jurisdiction that is 
selected most frequently by PPE firms although a number of PPE have incorporated as (or 
converted to) Maryland entities. For a detailed study and comparison of the principal pro-
visions of the Delaware and Maryland Corporation Statutes see James J. Hanks, Jr., Com-
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specific provisions of organizational laws that relate to PPE include 
formation, issuance of securities, dividends, reorganizations, and the 
duties and responsibilities of directors and shareholders, among others. 
 Since the corporate form is the most frequently observed organiza-
tional choice among PPE, I will focus here on that regime. One of the 
functions of corporate law is to provide businesses with a legal form 
that possesses the core attributes desired by business corporations.145 
According to Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, these attrib-
utes are: legal personality, limited liability, transferability of shares, 
delegated management, and investor ownership. Under this view, the 
goal of corporate law is to offer a legal form that makes these core 
attributes widely accessible, efficient, and friendly for its users.146 
 Another function of corporate law is to constrain value-reducing 
opportunism.147 Under this view, the goal of corporate law is to re-
duce the agency problems that arise from conflicts within the organi-
zation. According to Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, the law’s 
role is to remedy the exploitative tendencies of managers by, for ex-
ample, setting minimum voting rules and placing restrictions on 
managers.148 Hansmann and Kraakman take a broader view, defin-
ing conflicts to cover conflicts not only between managers and share-
holders, but also among shareholders and between shareholders and 
other constituents such as employees or creditors.149  
Alternative forms to the corporate form are available, and a 
number of PPE are organized as partnerships, limited liability com-
panies, and trusts. Some of the main considerations that drive the 
sponsor’s choice of form and jurisdiction of organization when struc-
turing private equity, as well as PPE, are tax treatment,150 limited 
liability protection,151 and the ability to waive fiduciary duties.152  
                                                                                                                  
parison of the Principal Provisions of the Delaware and Maryland Corporation Statutes 
(2016), in THE INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING LEGAL SOURCEBOOK (2d ed. 1998). 
 145. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 43, at 2 (“Self-evidently, a principal function 
of corporate law is to provide business enterprises with a legal form that possesses these 
five core attributes [of the business corporation].”). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. (“[A] second, equally important function of corporate law . . . is, constraining val-
ue-reducing forms of opportunism among the constituencies of the corporate enterprise.”).  
 148. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 1. 
 149. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 43 (describing the three principal conflicts 
with the corporation). 
 150. A partnership is a flow-through entity for federal income tax purposes; an LLC 
enjoys the same flow-through taxation as a partnership for federal income tax purposes 
but may be treated as a corporation for local tax purposes. JACK S. LEVIN & DONALD E. 
ROCAP, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY, AND ENTREPRENEURIAL 
TRANSACTIONS ¶ 1001 (2012) (discussing partnership versus corporate form for PE fund). 
 151. Limited liability is available to shareholders of a corporation, who will not be per-
sonally liable for a corporation’s debts, unless the shareholder actually participated in the 
act that created the liability. An LLC is generally treated like a corporation for limited 
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2.   Regulating PPE as Organizations 
 As discussed in Section III.A, the most pertinent risk for a public 
investor in PPE Type 1 is conflicts of interest between the public in-
vestor and insiders within the same entity. These risks are best ad-
dressed within the framework of organizational laws. 
 Even as private equity becomes public, PPE still retains many 
private company attributes. As such, not all PPE exhibit what cor-
porate law scholars have deemed core attributes of a company. 
Since the goal of corporate law is to facilitate a corporate legal 
form desired by its users, the emergence of PPE requires a re-
thinking of what it is we are trying to facilitate.  
 In addition, the agency problems in PPE take new forms. The 
usual assumption that “investors of capital have . . . highly homog-
enous interests among themselves, hence reducing . . . the potential 
for costly conflict among those who share governance of the firm” 
does not hold in PPE.153 Inter-investor conflicts arise in PPE be-
cause of the heterogeneous nature of investors’ interests. Within the 
PPE universe, certain conflicts are more acute in some types than 
in others, which then requires a tailoring of efforts to mitigate con-
flicts of interests. 
 With respect to fiduciary duties, there remain open questions 
about the extent to which traditional corporate fiduciary duties may 
be waived and whether they should also apply to unincorporated en-
tities. Delaware has been permissive on this topic. Delaware’s part-
nership statute, and the LLC statute that tracks the partnership 
statute, state that: “A partnership agreement may provide for the 
limitation or elimination of any and all liabilities for breach of con-
tract and breach of duties (including fiduciary duties)” and “a partner 
. . . shall not be liable . . . for breach of fiduciary duty for . . . good 
faith reliance on the provisions of the partnership agreement.”154  
 The general policy underlying these fiduciary duty waivers is the 
respect for the freedom of contract, which presumes that the parties 
                                                                                                                  
liability purposes. Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, 6 DEL. C. § 18-303(a). A gen-
eral partner typically has unlimited liability for the partnership’s liabilities, unless the 
general partner uses a limited-liability entity intermediary or the partnership qualifies as 
a limited liability partnership (LLP). Details about each of these strategies are outlined in  
LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 150, ¶ 302.1.2 (Difficulties in Achieving GP Limited Liability). 
However, “piercing the veil” or statutory liability doctrines (e.g., CERCLA, ERISA) apply 
equally whether the entity is a corporation, partnership, or LLC. 
 152. LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 150, ¶ 1001 (Partnership Versus Corporate Form for PE 
Fund).  
 153. John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Elements of 
Corporate Law: What Is Corporate Law 14 (Harv. Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 643, 
2009). 
 154. See Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 6 DEL. C. § 17-1101 (f) & (e); Del-
aware Limited Liability Company Act, 6 DEL. C. § 18-1101 (f) & (e).  
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have the capacity and opportunity to review and consent to the con-
tract. Free will, consent, assumption of risk, and private autonomy 
are used to legitimize the unavailability of certain core rights. But 
even in the case of a Delaware partnership, certain duties are non-
waivable. For example, the partnership agreement of private equity 
partnerships may not limit liability for a bad faith violation of the 
implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.155 
 PPE Type 1 firms have succeeded at “going public” while “stay-
ing private.” Incumbent owners of PPE Type 1 firms have used 
complex contracts and availed themselves of various legal and reg-
ulatory exceptions to retain most of the private benefits of private 
equity while spreading the risks and losses to new owners by tak-
ing their firms public.  
 Most critically, the control of the manager may be transferred to 
a third party and sponsors may sell their interests in the manager, 
in each case without unitholder consent.156 Similarly, one tier of in-
vestors may have separately negotiated rights to exit from their in-
vestment upon the departure of key management personnel. In each 
of these cases, one group of investors are able to limit their expo-
sure in a downturn by exiting before other groups without this ad-
vance notice opportunity. 
 Ronald Gilson and Charles Whitehead observe that a significant 
amount of interest in the primary offerings of “big name” private eq-
uity firms came from speculators and those who could not otherwise 
buy the underlying portfolio directly on more attractive terms.157 It is 
accepted that investors who have paid more (or can otherwise offer 
more to the issuer) should enjoy preferential rights. However, it 
would be unrealistic in these cases to rely on such investors to play a 
governing role to discipline the issuer on behalf of all investors, espe-
cially in cases where the conflict to be resolved arises between the 
institution and public investors. 
 This view of sophisticated investors’ presence as an indication that 
more protection of unsophisticated investors is needed goes against 
the current grain of scholarship and legislation.158 Current scholar-
ship has been focused on the governance role of sophisticated inves-
tors, especially institutional investors.159  
                                                                                                                  
 155. See Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 6 DEL. C. § 17-1101(c)-(f); Dela-
ware Limited Liability Company Act, 6 DEL. C. § 18-1101 (c)-(f). 
 156. Oaktree Capital (Form S-1), supra note 61, at 47-48. 
 157. Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 8, at 258-59 n.134. 
 158. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer 
Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999). 
 159. The recently passed JOBS Act, for example, increases the number of record 
shareholders that triggers securities regulation to 2,000 with the caveat that there are no 
more than 499 non-accredited investors. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-06 § 501, 126 Stat. 306, 
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 The missing lever in PPE Type 1 structure is that the general 
partner (GP) of PPE Type 1, if it is organized as a limited partner-
ship, has severely constricted its fiduciary duties to unitholders.160 
Specific waivers of fiduciary duties vis-à-vis common unitholders 
have been entered into by contract.161 For example, some GPs of PPE 
Type 1s have the right to make certain decisions in their sole discre-
tion, which is defined to mean that the GP may consider any inter-
ests and factors, including its own interest (i.e., in its individual ca-
pacity). Any such decision made by the GP in its individual capacity 
and not in its capacity as GP will be “without any fiduciary obligation 
to [the limited partners] or the common unitholders whatsoever.”162 
 As described at the outset, the goals of organizational laws are two-
fold. The first is to make available and facilitate the development of 
organizational forms that are desired by businesses, and the second is 
to mitigate conflicts of interest that arise within organizations. These 
two goals sometimes work in unison and other times in tension with 
one another. They are in tension when, for example, PPE sponsors 
may desire a full waiver of all personal liability arising from the enter-
prise. But organizational law—even the most permissive Delaware 
partnership statute—places limits on the sponsors’ ability to waive 
their liability for acts that constitute a bad faith violation of the im-
plied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.163 On the oth-
er hand, and in most cases, organizational law merely sets the starting 
point, allowing parties nearly full freedom to take as many steps in 
any direction from that starting point as they wish. As an example, 
although one standard feature of organizations is that owners of the 
                                                                                                                  
325 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(A)); Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 38, at 
365 (“This is a bow to the idea that such investors should protect themselves in terms of 
information rights, but the number of shareholders is then capped at 1,999, so that the 
idea cannot be taken to the extreme of an unlimited “sophisticated” shareholder base that 
never triggers 1934 Act registration.”). 
 160. Oaktree Capital (Form S-1), supra note 61, at 185-86. 
 161. The decision and manner in which fiduciary duties are waived to the fullest extent 
in PPE is consistent with the empirical findings of legal scholars who have studied public-
ly-traded limited partnerships and limited liability companies. See Suren Gomtsian, The 
Governance of Publicly Traded Limited Liability Companies, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 207, 234-
37 (2015) (finding that the majority of the 20 entities reviewed contain limits on fiduciary 
duties of care and loyalty); Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alter-
native Entity Law: Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 558 
(2012) (finding that the majority of the 85 entities reviewed contain waiver or elimination 
of fiduciary duties without substitute mechanisms); Sandra K. Miller, A New Direction for 
LLC Research in a Contractarian Legal Environment, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 351 (2003) (ob-
serving few contractual protections of minority shareholders); cf. Michelle M. Harner & 
Jamie Marincic, The Naked Fiduciary, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 879 (2012) (finding non-uniformity 
across the 129 non-listed entities reviewed). 
 162. The Blackstone Group L.P., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 183 (Mar. 22, 2007) 
[hereinafter Blackstone (Form S-1)], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1393818/ 
000104746907002068/a2176832zs-1.htm [https://perma.cc/T59G-2RC3]. 
 163. See Delaware Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 6 DEL. C. § 17-1101(c)-(f). 
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organizations have the right to vote, there is no rule which prohibits 
an issuer from issuing only non-voting stock to its stockholders, should 
it so choose.164  
 As PPE expands the private equity investment opportunity to 
public investors whose interests are not as well protected by contrac-
tual means, the agency-cost reducing role of organizational law be-
comes increasingly important and more limits on the facilitative na-
ture of organizational laws may become appropriate.  
B.   PPE as Fund Structures 
1.   Regulatory Overview 
 1940 Act. Why do we have a separate regulatory regime for in-
vestment companies? The express function of investment company 
regulation is to regulate firms that hold investment securities that 
have been purchased with other people’s money. An implicit function 
of fund regulation is to regulate a particular kind of agency relation-
ship or organizational structure that is associated with such firms.165 
Both functions stem from the observation that firms that invest pri-
marily in securities and manage assets on behalf of others are par-
ticularly susceptible to irresponsible management and unfair treat-
ment of investors, therefore requiring special regulatory treatment.  
 Under the Investment Company Act, “investment company” is 
defined as any company that pools the investment of a number of 
investors into a fund that engages in the investment of securities.166 
A “company” is defined in section 2(a)(8) of the Act as “a corpora-
tion, [] partnership, [] association, [] joint-stock company, [] trust, [] 
fund, or any organized group of persons whether incorporated or 
not.”167 So, unless a private equity fund can find an applicable ex-
emption, it will be an investment company that is subject to the 
1940 Act’s regulatory provisions. 
 Funds that are treated as a BDC under the 1940 Act may qualify 
as a RIC for federal income tax purposes. If the fund is an RIC under 
Subchapter M of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the ‘Code’), 
it will not be required to pay corporate-level income tax on its in-
vestment income.168 As a RIC, the fund is required to distribute sub-
                                                                                                                  
 164. Easterbrook and Fischel give the example of Ford, which issued non-voting stock 
so that it could keep company in the family’s hands. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 
47, at 13.  
 165. Morley, supra note 27, at 1279-81 (explaining the core function of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940). 
 166. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A).  
 167. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(8). 
 168. 26 U.S.C. §§ 851-852.  
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stantially all (i.e., at least 90%) of its income to shareholders. In addi-
tion, RICs must diversify their holdings within percentage limits 
specified in the Code.169  
 In addition to the BDC regime, funds may also seek to be li-
censed by the Small Business Administration (“SBA”) as a small 
business investment company (“SBIC”) under section 681(c) of the 
Small Business Investment Act of 1958.170 SBICs refer to businesses 
that make loans, invest in equity securities, and provide consulting 
and advisory services to eligible small businesses. The SBA guaran-
tees debentures of SBICs in amounts up to twice the amount of pri-
vately-raised funds of the SBIC.  
 Advisers Act. Why do we have a separate regulatory regime for 
fund advisers?171 The purpose of fund adviser regulation is to protect 
the clients of an investment adviser (which, in the case of private eq-
uity firms, would be the funds organized by the sponsors).172 The Ad-
visers Act regulates the sponsors and advisers of investment funds 
and requires them to register with and be regulated as an investment 
adviser by the SEC unless they fall under an exemption.173 Advisers 
to private equity funds fall squarely under the definition of “invest-
ment adviser” under the Advisers Act and are required to register as 
such unless exemptions apply.174 
 Some advisers to private equity funds are exempt altogether from 
registration requirements and from being regulated by the provisions 
of the Advisers Act (including the fee limitations described above un-
der Part III.A.3). There are three exemptions that are the most fre-
quently used by advisers to private equity funds: first, is as an in-
vestment adviser solely to private funds that has less than $150 mil-
lion in assets under management; second, is as an investment advis-
er that is regulated as an adviser in the state where it has its princi-
pal office and has less than $25 million in assets under management; 
and third, is an investment adviser that does not advise any 1940 
Act-registered investment companies.175  
                                                                                                                  
 169. Id. 
 170. 15 U.S.C. § 681(c). 
 171. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 was originally enacted as Chapter 686, Title 
II, sections 201-244, and is now codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 et seq. 
 172. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1. 
 173. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3. An investment adviser that is not registered with the SEC may 
be required to register with the state where its principal place of business is located (blue 
sky laws). 
 174. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11).  
 175. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 203A (2015) (as amended).  
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2.   Regulating PPE as Funds 
 As discussed in Section III.B, the most pertinent risk for a public 
investor in PPE Type 2 is conflicts of interest between the public in-
vestor and investors in other funds managed by the same investment 
adviser. These risks are best addressed within the framework of fund 
and adviser regulations.  
 Most PPE Type 2s have elected to be regulated as both a BDC un-
der the Investment Company Act and a RIC under Subchapter M of 
the Code. A number of PPE Type 2s limit their investments to small 
businesses to avail themselves of the SBA guarantees. This subjects 
PPE Type 2 to the governance requirements of the Investment Com-
pany Act (such as section 2(a)(19), which requires the majority of 
PPE Type 2’s board of directors to be “noninterested” persons and 
places severe restrictions and regulations on the relationship be-
tween the BDC and its investment adviser) but relieves PPE Type 2 
from several key economic restrictions otherwise applicable to in-
vestment companies under the Investment Company Act (notably, 
leverage requirements).176  
 Generally, to be eligible to elect BDC status, a fund must furnish 
capital to companies that do not have access to conventional financ-
ing channels.177 At least 70% of a BDC’s total assets must be invested 
in eligible investments and assets that include non-listed and smaller  
cap companies.178  
 In addition to providing capital, BDCs must also offer significant 
managerial assistance to their portfolio companies,179 which may take 
the form of guidance and counsel over the management, operations, 
or business objectives and policies of the portfolio companies, or exer-
cising a controlling influence over the management of the portfolio 
companies.180 This definition closely tracks the private equity model 
of ownership, except that the definition only requires that an offer, 
and not the actual provision, of managerial assistance be made. And, 
in the case where multiple BDCs are acting together in a deal, a BDC 
                                                                                                                  
 176. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f). 
 177. Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, § 2(a)(46), 123 Stat. 2059 
(as amended in 2009). 
 178. Even the remainder of BDC’s assets must still be invested in a manner that is con-
sistent with the purpose of a BDC. See Definition of Eligible Portfolio Co. Under the Inv. Co. 
Act of 1940, Release No. 27538 (Nov. 30, 2006) (codified at 17 CFR § 270.2a-46 & 17 CFR § 
270.55a-1 (2007)) (“Congress did not specifically regulate how a BDC should invest the re-
mainder of its assets (‘30% basket’) Congress clarified, however, that a BDC would be required 
to invest its 30% basket in a manner consistent with the overall purpose of SBIIA.” (citations 
omitted)), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/ic-27538.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8M2-PVTY].  
 179. Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, § 2(a)(47).  
 180. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(47). 
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can meet this requirement so long as any person in the group makes 
available such managerial assistance.181  
 Other sections of the Investment Company Act govern the various 
operational elements of BDCs including the board of directors, relat-
ed party transactions, leverage, valuation, code of ethics, fidelity 
bond requirements, indemnification, compliance programs, disclosure 
controls and procedures and internal control over financial reporting. 
 The BDC, RIC, and SBA regimes can best be summarized as re-
gimes that relax certain regulatory levers or provide perks to private 
equity funds that stimulate the flow of capital and offer advisory ser-
vices to businesses without access to traditional financing channels. 
This regulatory treatment recognizes the value that private equity 
strategies could bring to these firms and the subsequent value that 
such firms could add by creating jobs and revitalizing the economy.  
 Such positive externalities must, however, be balanced against the 
primary goals of fund regulation, which, as stated at the outset of 
this Section, are to foster responsible management and fair treat-
ment of the funds’ investors. As PPE expands the private equity in-
vestment opportunity to public investors, the weight placed on these 
primary rationales for fund regulation becomes more elevated.  
C.   PPE as Securities 
1.   Regulatory Overview 
 1933 Act. Why do we regulate the offering of securities? The pur-
pose of the 1933 Act is to provide full and fair disclosure of the char-
acter of securities sold and to prevent fraud in the sales of securi-
ties.182 The main function of the 1933 Act is investor protection, 
through mandated disclosure, with transparency as the dominant 
regulatory objective.183 In particular, the focus is on the protection of 
public investors. The Supreme Court has described disclosures and 
other protections of the 1933 Act as not being needed for those inves-
tors who could “fend for themselves.”184 
 All issuers of securities are required to provide detailed disclo-
sures relating to the issuer and the securities, but private equity 
businesses have availed themselves of the various exemptions avail-
                                                                                                                  
 181. This is how specialty finance companies can also operate as a BDC by partnering 
with a private equity fund that offers significant managerial assistance. 
 182. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); 
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953); SEC v. Sw. Coal & Energy Co., 624 F.2d 1312, 
1318 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 183. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 38, at 338 (“Markets are increasingly 
fragmented and often opaque, even as transparency has become the dominant regulatory 
objective . . . .”). 
 184. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). 
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able under section 4 of the 1933 Act. These exemptions include 
transactions that do not involve any public offering and the private 
placement exemption contained in SEC Regulation D’s operative safe 
harbor exemptions.185  
 1934 Act. Why do we regulate public companies differently from 
their private counterparts? The purpose of the 1934 Act is to regulate 
securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets and to prevent 
inequitable and unfair practices on those exchanges and markets.186  
 The question of when a private enterprise should be forced to take 
on public status has significant legal and cost implications. Section 
12(g) of the 1934 Act specifies the issuers that are required to regis-
ter their securities with the SEC.187 A 1934 Act reporting company is 
subject to the registration requirements and other regulations of the 
1934 Act and must file annual reports on Form 10-K, quarterly fi-
nancials on Form 10-Q, current reports on material developments on 
Form 8-K, and annual proxy statements, among others.188  
2.   Regulating PPE as Securities 
 As discussed in Section III.C, the most pertinent risk for a public 
investor in the various entities that comprise PPE Type 3 is the qual-
ity and timing of disclosures. These concerns are best addressed 
within the framework of securities regulation. The key component 
that is relevant to evaluating PPE as a public company is the timing 
and identity of the PPE entity that decides to engage in an IPO and 
list its shares on an exchange. In this way, the public investors’ 
point(s) of entry in the PPE structure is relevant to determining the 
quality and content of the security and disclosures that are required 
to be made.  
 To start, the main features that applicable laws and regulations 
have been focused on when regulating private equity and PPE have 
been the size of the fund (i.e., total dollar amount of assets under 
management) and the representative investor of the fund. This 
makes sense when private equity pools only from sophisticated in-
vestors and the main regulatory focus is on the spillover and sys-
temic risk implications of private equity and other funds on the 
broader financial markets.  
 But because PPE interfaces with public investors directly, even 
small funds and even those with only a few public investors are sus-
ceptible to conflicts and mismanagement that trigger regulation. The 
                                                                                                                  
 185. 15 U.S.C. § 77d. 
 186. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was originally enacted as Chapter 404, sec-
tions 1-39, and is now codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp. 
 187. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g). 
 188. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b). 
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opportunity to invest alongside sophisticated investors may well be 
what public investors want and explains why many have celebrated 
PPE as a welcome expansion and leveling of the investment playing 
field. But even in that case (or perhaps especially so in this case, 
since it means PPE is a product that public investors will actively 
invest in), regulatory backstops and protections should operate in the 
ways in which they were originally intended. 
 Yet another challenge of the well-known private equity players’ 
IPOs is that the historical performance results are not necessarily 
indicative or relevant to the future results that public investors 
should expect from their investment. Yet, in the prospectus, the is-
suer presents information relating to the historical performance of 
the funds on a consolidated basis. For the manager entity in PPE 
Type 3, the value of assets and liabilities recognized in the pre-IPO 
financial statements remain unchanged when carried forward into 
the post-IPO financial statements because the sponsors of the pre-
IPO business continue to control the post-IPO business.189 As a re-
sult, the predecessor’s financial statements are used as the post-
IPO entity’s historical financial statements.  
 For this reason, PPE Type 3 may be a good candidate for the “sea-
soning period” Adam Pritchard recommends in a recent article. The 
proposed seasoning period allows the market to process information 
about a new issuer prior to any public offering and may be appropri-
ate for issuances by well-known private equity sponsors that have a 
rich operating history but no history operating under the proposed 
post-IPO structure.190 In each case, it would be helpful for the public 
investor to understand what she is getting relevant to other investors 
based on an example of prior years, using the seasoning period as a 
way for PPE to reset its track record under the business model that is 
more pertinent to the public investor.  
 PPEs are companies that have launched a 1933 Act registered 
public offering and whose shares are listed on a national securities 
exchange, subjecting them to the requirements of the 1934 Act. The 
SEC, however, has the power to exempt certain issuers under its ex-
emptive authority pursuant to section 14A(e) of the Exchange Act. 
For example, emerging growth companies (EGCs), as defined under 
the JOBS Act, enjoy a host of reduced disclosures, and some PPEs 
have availed themselves of EGC status.191 
                                                                                                                  
 189. See Oaktree Capital (Form S-1), supra note 61, at 60. 
 190. A. C. Pritchard, Revisiting “Truth in Securities” Revisited: Abolishing IPOs and 
Harnessing Private Markets in the Public Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 999 (2013). 
 191. The JOBS Act eases some of the public company requirements (such as the re-
quirement of an auditor assessment of a company’s internal controls) for emerging growth 
companies. A subset of 1934 Act obligations will not apply for five years, subject to reve-
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 As private equity funds invest in private companies, there is no 
publicly available information about the portfolio companies in which 
the funds invest. Investors of the fund entity in PPE Type 3 must re-
ly on the valuations performed by the agents of the fund. Private eq-
uity and PPE are particularly susceptible to valuation problems.  
 Recently, Fifth Street Finance Corp. (a publicly-listed BDC) and 
its investment adviser, Fifth Street Asset Management (FSAM) (also 
publicly-listed), were named as defendants in various legal proceed-
ings.192 The central claim brought against Fifth Street Finance Corp. 
was the mismanagement of Fifth Street Finance Corp. to boost the 
valuation of FSAM when it went public in 2014.  
 Fifth Street Finance Corp. entered into settlement agreements, 
which call for a payment of $14,050,000 (99% of which will be paid 
from insurance coverage). The proposed settlement of the sharehold-
er derivative actions provides for waiver of fees charged by a Fifth 
Street affiliate to Fifth Street Finance Corp. for ten consecutive quar-
ters and committing to a previously announced decrease in the base 
management fee from 2% to 1.75% for at least four years.193  
While Fifth Street insiders may have been able to shortchange some 
of their investors at times, the ultimate resolution was one that bene-
fitted all investors of the publicly-traded securities across the Fifth 
Street platform. Investors and regulators were able to advocate and 
bargain for the fee structure and governance changes they desired. 
The proposed settlement includes certain governance and over-
sight enhancements, including provisions relating to equity owner-
ship by board members, disclosure of executive compensation, direc-
tor independence, valuation policies and processes, creation of a 
credit risk and conflicts committee, and increased consultation with 
outside advisers and independent third parties.194 FSAM also en-
tered into an agreement to settle its securities class action with a 
payment of $9,250,000. 195  
 The key takeaway is that PPE picks and chooses from a menu of 
economic, financial, governance, and regulatory attributes in ways 
                                                                                                                  
nues / market capitalization tests. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106 § 101, 126 Stat. 306, 307 
(2012).  
 192. In re Fifth Street Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 15-cv-7759 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. 2016); In 
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 193. Fifth Street Fin. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Aug. 4, 2016) [hereinafter 
Fifth Street Fin. Corp. (Form 8-K)], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1414932/ 
000114420416116399/v446026_8k.htm [https://perma.cc/2R7P-LWTU]. 
 194. Id.  
 195. Id.  
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that situate it all over the map. PPE are hybrid organizations that 
combine the liquidity benefits of going public with the private benefits 
of private company governance. PPE alters previously-held assump-
tions about both publicly-held firms and private equity, and there is a 
high degree of customization in PPE. Ignoring the heterogeneity across 
the PPE universe may be the source of some regulatory gaps.  
 With the goal of organizing the universe across the dimensions 
that regulations care most about, I use the investor’s point of invest-
ment in the private equity structure as a way to meaningfully sort 
through the PPE universe and their regulation. Here, I have divided 
the forty-two PPE into those that offer to investors a share of the ad-
viser / manager, fund, or both. Each group will of course contain a 
diverse set of issuers, but the three-part simplification helps inves-
tors understand the distinct investment opportunities and allows 
regulators to take the view of the investors that the regulations seek 
to protect.  
  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Traditional private equity draws large investments from a small 
number of investors with the promise of delivering high levels of re-
turns to their investors using innovative governance structures and 
investment strategies. And in large part, these innovations were 
achievable because the managers of private equity firms and funds 
were able to operate without the control and interference by fund in-
vestors, who relied on non-legal levers such as reputation and market 
power to protect themselves from managerial misconduct.196 But 
what happens when public investors enter the picture? The decision 
of a number of private equity firms and funds to go public has 
prompted this question and is the motivation of this Article. 
 One positive outcome of this recent development has been the ex-
panded availability of private equity innovations to the public inves-
tors. However, innovation can also breed investor and regulatory con-
fusion. This Article offers a typology to segment the PPE universe 
according to whether the public investor is purchasing a share of the 
private equity adviser, fund, or both.  
 The typology looks at PPE from the perspective of the public in-
vestor and its relative position within the PPE structure. This Article 
also identifies the core functions of the multiple regulatory frame-
works that apply, and which are sometimes in tension, and offers a 
segmented analysis of PPE that reflects this regulatory multiplicity. 
The analytical components that are relevant to evaluating PPE are 
                                                                                                                  
 196. See Drury, III, supra note 10, at 84-86. 
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first, the structural and governance arrangements regarding owner-
ship and control, and second, the nature and extent of conflicts of in-
terest that arise therefrom. In this Article, I have shown that there is 
significant variety within the PPE segment on each of these dimen-
sions and developed a typology that can be a useful sorting mecha-
nism to examine the perils that each of the organizational, fund, and 
securities regulatory regimes care most about. 
 The typology can be used to design more tailored approaches to 
regulation that match each regulatory apparatus to its intended 
function. It can also be used to reevaluate existing regulatory ef-
forts to engage in such tailoring. This review of PPE can also be 
used to generate new perspectives on the substantive doctrines and 
persistent debates in corporate law such as the desirability of inves-
tor passivity, the corporate democracy myth, and the contractual 
limits on waivers of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.197 The overlapping 
roles of fiduciary doctrine, investor sophistication, and contract law 
in this area set up a robust research agenda for the future.
                                                                                                                  
 197. The operative question being: should corporate law rules be enabling (i.e., corpora-
tions are free to opt out) or mandatory (i.e., corporations would be limited from opting out)? 
Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Foreword—The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corpo-
rate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989), and Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Tra-
ditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703 (1989), with Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989). 


